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1. Introduction
“From development to poverty reduction” sums up the trajectory of the develop-
ment discourse in Africa over nearly five decades since the advent of self-rule. 
Immediately after gaining independence from the colonialists in the sixties and 
early seventies, African economies showed remarkable economic performance, 
with an average GDP growth rate of about 5.7%. The trend was reversed from 
the mid-seventies, following several shocks such as the oil crises, droughts and 
civil wars. This saw the advent of Africa’s crisis, which greatly shaped the Africa 
of today, a continent considered to be the most vulnerable, poverty-stricken, 
debt-distressed, technically backward and marginalized. The eighties have been 
characterized as the “lost development decade” for Africa, as reflected by weak 
growth in the productive sectors, poor export performance, mounting debt, de-
teriorating social conditions, environmental degradation and the increasing decay 
of institutional capacity (World Bank, 1989, as quoted by Cheru, 1992). Africa is 
the only continent in the world that has grown poorer in the last 25 years, thus 
approximately 50% of its current population live in absolute poverty (people sur-
vive on less than US$1 per day). There were about 580 million in Africa in 1995, 
out of which 291 million had average incomes of less than one dollar per day in 
1998 (World Bank, 2001). The continent is the only region where the incidence 
of poverty could worsen by 2015 given that it requires a sustained per capita 
growth rate of at least 4.6% per annum to make significant progress towards 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (AfDB, 2003). Africa also has a very 
low per capita income compared with other regions. Per capita income for the 
continent increased from an average of US$339.8 over 1970–1975 to US$709 
over 2000–2003, compared with an increase from US$1,207.3 to US$5,309.3 
for the world over the same period (UNCTAD online statistics). This marginal 
increase in per capita income falls short of redressing the substantial income 
losses and impoverishment of the lost decades. 
There exists a lot of information on the probable causes of the African crisis, 
but there is hardly any consensus on the cause of the crisis. Some attempts to 
analyze causes of the crisis identified domestic policy failures as the main cause 
(AfDB, 1995). However, the Berg Report (World Bank, 1981) demonstrated that 
external factors, such as rising interest rates and deteriorating terms of trade 
contributed considerably to the economic crisis. Other stakeholders have at-
tributed the crisis to various reasons, among them: weak and non-hegemonic 
nature of the state; corrupt, dependent and weak nature of the dominant elites; 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the bureaucracy; weak nature of the African 
market; technological backwardness; dependence on foreign capital; misman-
agement and poor planning; and inability to set up effective regional integration 
schemes. Policies of africanization, indigenization, nationalization, import substitu-
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tion, joint ventures, stabilization and structural adjustment have had a very limited 
effect on the quality of life, degree of political stability, and the ability of the state 
to build supremacy, construct national projects or meet the basic needs of the 
vast majority of the people (Ihonvbere, 1996).
This paper focuses on poverty reduction efforts in Africa, with specific 
inference on Kenya. Poverty reduction is one of the major development chal-
lenges facing low-income countries as evidenced by the current development 
agenda under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Under the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration signed in 2000, it was proposed that an enabling environment con-
ducive to development and poverty reduction be created, both at national and 
international levels. The focus on poverty is justified by the extent and depth of 
poverty itself in many economies, and also its implications on other social and 
economic processes.
Following the development path since independence of many African 
states, it is recognized that several efforts (both at national and international 
levels) have been carried out to reduce/eradicate poverty. The international 
financial institutions have played a major role not only in Africa, but also in other 
low-income countries in supporting development and poverty reduction. The 
historical role of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) reveals a focus on develop-
ment policies between 1950 and 1980, but a change in focus towards poverty 
reduction after several criticisms about development with a human face. Another 
factor that has shaped the evolution of this role (as will be discussed later) has 
been the issue of ownership of programs. It is recognized that government own-
ership and political will have greater influence on the timing, the extent and the 
sustainability of the reform program, than the availability of financial resources 
such as aid. The research questions that arise here are: 
What has been the impact of policies pursued by the international  -
financial institutions on poverty reduction efforts in Africa?
What has been the role of national governments and regional  -
initiatives in the fight against poverty in Africa?
Is there policy coherence between poverty reduction efforts under  -
PRSP, NEPAD framework and MDG policy options, with specific 
inference on the Kenyan case?
Can this poverty reduction trajectory lead us to the set objectives  -
of, for example, meeting the MDG goals by 2015? What is the way 
forward for poverty reduction in Africa?
The rest of the (this) paper is organized as follows: Section two sheds some 
light on the concept of poverty. Section three outlines the evolving role of the 
Bretton Woods Institutions in Africa, with specific focus on the impact on poverty 
reduction. Section four provides a critical evaluation of the NEPAD framework as 
the major development agenda currently being pursued by Africa, and provides 
an insight into poverty reduction efforts in Kenya. This paper concludes with 
section five, mainly by highlighting the major weaknesses in previous poverty 
eradication efforts, and thereby proposing the way forward for poverty reduc-
tion in Africa.
2. The Concept of Poverty
Despite years of effort in fighting poverty, certain misconceptions still remain 
about the poor, such as why they are poor and what is needed to help them lift 
themselves out of poverty. Poverty is a multidimensional fact of life (World Bank, 
2000), and it manifests itself in various forms. Therefore, there is no uniform 
standard for measuring poverty, even though it is widely viewed as the lack of 
sufficient income. Some groups in the population often face a combination of the 
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predicaments associated with poverty —low income, illiteracy, premature death, 
early marriage, large families, malnutrition, and illness and injury etc.— which 
locks them into unacceptable low standards of living. In general terms, poverty 
can be defined as the inability to attain a certain predetermined minimum level 
of consumption at which basic needs of a society or country are assumed to 
be satisfied (Manda et al, 2001). The minimum level of consumption at which 
basic needs are assumed to be satisfied is known as the poverty line.
According to the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen 
(March 1995): “Poverty has various manifestations, including lack of income 
and productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihoods; hunger 
and malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack of access to education and other 
basic services; increased morbidity and mortality from illness; homelessness 
and inadequate housing; unsafe environments; and social discrimination and 
exclusion. It is also characterized by lack of participation in decision-making 
and in civil, social and cultural life”.
The World Bank’s 2000 World Development Report defines poverty 
as an unacceptable deprivation in human well-being that can comprise both 
physiological and social deprivation. Physiological deprivation involves the non-
fulfillment of basic material or biological needs, including inadequate nutrition, 
health, education and shelter. A person can be considered poor if he or she is 
unable to secure the goods and services to meet these basic material needs. 
The concept of physiological deprivation is thus closely related to low monetary 
income and consumption levels, but it can extend beyond. Social deprivation 
widens the concept of deprivation to include risk, vulnerability, lack of autonomy, 
powerlessness and lack of self-respect. Given that countries’ definitions of dep-
rivation often go beyond physiological deprivation and sometimes give greater 
weight to social deprivation, local population (including poor communities) 
should be engaged in the dialogue that leads to a most appropriate definition 
of poverty in a country.
Poverty may be defined in absolute or relative terms (GoK, 1998). Abso-
lute poverty is a state where one cannot raise the income required to meet the 
expenditure for purchasing a specified number of basic requirements. Relative 
poverty is when one cannot purchase a bundle of basic needs available to a 
reference social group, such as people within a median income level. 
The perpetuation and aggravation of poverty and the apparent inability of 
many people to break down the vicious circles of poverty call for new approaches 
in tackling the problem.
Categorizing and characterizing the poor requires an understanding of pov-
erty and its causes (World Bank, 2001). There are three overlapping categories that 
are important in the African context: chronic versus transitory poverty; the poor 
versus the destitute; and dependent versus economically active poor. Destitute 
people mostly fall under the chronic poor, while the economically active fall in and 
out of poverty because of vulnerability to economic shocks. Household poverty 
is also linked to the stages in the life cycle, whereby households are likely to be 
poor when they have many young children, and also in old age.
3. The Role of the Bretton Woods Institutions in Poverty Reduction   
in Africa
Traditionally, the role of the International Monetary Found (IMF) in low-income 
countries was towards stabilization policies that were aimed at reducing short-
term disequilibrium, especially budget deficits, balance of payments deficits and 
inflation, while the Bank’s structural adjustment policies were geared towards 
orienting the structure of the economy towards greater efficiency in the medium 
term. Three categories of policies formed part of almost every Fund program: 
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demand restraint; switching policies; and policies related to long-term supply 
or efficiency. The aim of demand restraint policies was to curtail expenditure on 
imports and release resources for exports. Major policy instruments included: 
reduction in government expenditure and budget deficit; controls over money 
supply and credit creation; and policies to cut real wages. Switching policies 
were aimed at shifting resources from non-tradables to tradables by changing 
incentives. Policy instruments included: devaluation and exchange rate unifica-
tion; changes in domestic prices especially in agriculture and wage control. On 
the other hand, long-term supply policies were for raising the long-term efficiency 
of the economy by securing a more market-oriented economy subject to fewer 
restrictions and less segmentation. Reforms included trade liberalization, along 
with financial and price reforms. The World Bank policies, on the other hand, 
were also strongly market-oriented, and like those of the Fund, stressed mon-
etary and fiscal orthodoxy, appropriate real exchange rates, positive real interest 
rates, and liberal approaches on the external account (Helleiner, 1988, as quoted 
by Stewart et al., 1994). Helleiner (1998) indicates that the categorization of the 
Bank policies suggests four major elements: 
Mobilization of domestic resources through fiscal, monetary  -
and credit policies and improved financial performance of public 
enterprises. 
Improvements in -  the efficiency of resource use throughout the 
economy. Measures in the public sector included: reform and 
privatization; while measures in the private sector included price 
decontrol, reduction of subsidies, competition from imports and 
credit reform and encouragement to foreign direct investment. 
Trade policies, which entailed liberalization, with reduction and  -
removal of import quotas, improved export incentives and some 
institutional reforms to support exports. 
Institutional reforms, which aimed at strengthening the capacity of  -
the public sector and increasing the efficiency of public enterprises 
and also improved institutions to support the productive sectors.
The role of the IMF and the World Bank in Africa dates as far back as the insti-
tutions financial intervention after the first and second oil shocks. The average 
growth rate for Africa decelerated sharply to about 3.5% over 1974–1979 (down 
from an average of 6% after independence) following the adverse effects of the 
first oil shock (AfDB, 1995). To be able to assist the continent to solve the balance 
of payments problems resulting from the crisis, the IMF introduced the first idea 
of a concessional or soft loan window for low-income countries.
The role of the BWIs in Africa can be subdivided into two main phases: the 
initial intervention phase, whereby the focus of intervention was initially geared 
towards the traditional role of macroeconomic stabilization policy, and other 
market oriented reforms (neoliberal policies), and then a redirection in lending 
approach towards poverty reduction.
3.1. Macroeconomic Stabilization Policy and Other Market Oriented   
Reforms
After the first oil crisis, the IMF provided its initial balance of payments support 
in the form of the Oil Facility Subsidy Account in 1975, which was followed by 
the Trust Fund in 1976. These types of loans were subject to only first-tranche 
conditionality, which implied that an eligible member country was required to 
prove that it faced a balance of payments problem and to demonstrate that it 
was making a reasonable effort to correct it. Nearly all countries that were eligible 
on the basis of having low per capita income borrowed their share of available 
9OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
funds. However, the idea of conditioning concessional loans on specific policy 
commitments was becoming more widely accepted by the time the Trust Fund 
was exhausted. The Extended Fund Facility (EFF) on the other hand was intended 
to help countries carry out “comprehensive programs that included policies of 
the scope and character required to correct structural imbalances in produc-
tion, trade and prices”. They were meant to have longer-term maturities, with 
market interest rates being charged on ordinary stand-by arrangements. This 
arrangement provided a blend of financing available to low-income countries, 
which included conditional stand-by or extended arrangements at regular rates 
and low-conditionality loans at concessional rates. This type of lending did not 
help solve the crisis in borrowing states, a fact that the IMF attributed to easy 
access to loans with low conditionality combined with a general deterioration 
in the external environment that borrowers faced (IMF, 1985). 
The defunct Trust Fund was replaced by the Structural Adjustment Facility 
(SAF), which was formally created on 26 March 1986. This was the foundation 
of Africa’s period of economic reform and privatization. Countries were expected 
to formulate a medium-term policy framework, which was to be drafted by both 
the member country and the World Bank representatives. Loan approval was 
conditional on the specification of a detailed set of policy commitments even 
though a country was given a greater benefit of doubt on its willingness and abil-
ity to carry out those commitments than it would have been with a conventional 
upper-tranche arrangement. The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Program 
(ESAF) replaced the SAF in 1987, mainly on the premise that it would have a 
larger injection into low-income countries in the 1990s, and it would also offer 
balance of payments support substantially and sustainably and foster growth in 
Africa. The first initial lending project to Africa was a loan to Malawi on 15th July 
1988. This facility was enlarged and extended in December 1993, and made a 
permanent facility in 1996. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative 
was also later linked to concessional ESAF operations. The Bank published Sub-
Saharan Africa – From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term Perspective 
Study in 1989 after criticism from several agencies, United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the (Organization of African Unity (OAU). 
This led to the Bank’s realization that adjustment cannot be carried out at the 
expense of the people. The report considered state participation in the economy, 
and recognized the political dimensions of the crisis, the role of corruption and 
political competition, the marginalization of the people from decision-making 
processes, and the need for democratization in the society. The report empha-
sized issues of good governance to enable African states to meet their global 
obligations and to better implement structural adjustment programs. From the 
Bank’s perspective, the nineties represented a period of increased policy-based 
lending. The realization that economic recovery in Africa was yet to be achieved, 
necessitated a change in the view that SAFs were more for short-run stabiliza-
tion rather than supply side reforms (World Bank, 1994).
Following the dismal performance of low-income economies that had im-
plemented the SAFs, including those that were termed the good adjusters and 
the mounting critic of the program, several reviews were carried out on the ESAF 
process. The reviews concluded that the Policy Framework Papers (PFPs) had 
largely failed to reach their objectives and highlighted a number of problems with 
ESAF-supported programs, including lack of national ownership; weaknesses in 
the analytical and empirical bases of the social policy content of programs; and 
insufficient attention to trade-offs involving policy choices that imply significantly 
different paths for growth and social welfare (IMF, 2004). The realization that 
ESAF could not deliver the set objectives, and also given the above limitations, 
the partner institutions embarked on coming up with a new approach that would 
counter some of the shortcomings of the previous lending program. The new 
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approach was therefore supposed to strengthen country ownership, enhance 
the poverty focus of country programs and provide for stronger collaboration 
between the Bretton Woods Institutions and, more broadly, among development 
partners in supporting country development efforts. This led to the introduction 
of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PGRF).
 3.2. Poverty Reduction
What has been the role of the Bretton Woods Institutions in poverty reduction in 
Africa? Looking at the history of the role of these institutions in Africa, several direct 
initiatives/mandates were undertaken to fight the rising poverty levels in Africa.
 Unlike the Fund, the Bank’s initial programs in low-income countries in 
late 70s did not have poverty reduction as a clearly mandated objective per 
se, but hinted at focusing on pro-poor projects. Project lending was initiated in 
the seventies, which entailed financing of capital infrastructure such as roads 
and railways, telecommunications, ports and power facilities. The initial idea of 
pro-poor initiatives was endeavored when the emphasis of the development 
strategies was changed to focus more on investments that could directly affect 
the well being of the masses of poor people in developing countries by making 
them more productive and by integrating them as active partners in the develop-
ment process. These projects failed, raising some of the initial concerns about 
the success of the Bank’s programs in low-income countries. 
The turning point for both Bretton Woods Institutions in terms of commit-
ment to poverty reduction in poor countries was in 1999 when a clear mandate 
was undertaken to integrate the objectives of poverty reduction and growth 
more fully into its operations. A new framework of support was adopted, which 
comprised of two key elements: country-authored PRSPs, which were expected 
to draw on broad-based consultation with key stakeholders, and the PRGF, 
which replaced the ESAF. The programs supported by the PRGF were to be 
derived from the PRSPs to ensure country ownership and also clear orientation 
towards achieving joint objectives of poverty reduction and growth. Unlike ESAF, 
the PRGF was to ensure more clearly focused policies, which not only enjoyed 
better national ownership but also more consistent implementation structure 
(IMF, 2001; World Bank, 2004). The PRSP process emphasized: the need for 
realistic short-term goals; the importance of the initial conditions when assessing 
the degree of progress; the variation in the nature and content of country-specific 
PRSPs and the dynamism of the PRSP process. Its underlying principles were: 
a country-driven and broad-based participation approach; results oriented and 
focused on pro-poor outcomes; recognition of the multi-dimensional nature of 
poverty and the proposed policy response; partnership oriented involving co-
ordinated participation of development partners; and grounded in a long-term 
perspective for poverty reduction (IMF, 2004; World Bank, 2004). The major 
purposes of the PRSP are: 
For the country: -  to lay out realistic but challenging poverty 
objectives, along with policies needed to achieve them;
For the Bretton Woods Institutions: to provide a suitable basis for  -
their concessional lending; 
And for other development partners: to offer a key instrument  -
around which to organize their relationship with low-income 
countries.
3.3 The Bretton Woods Institutions and Poverty in Africa
Many critics of the Bank’s and Fund’s activities have argued that many policies 
pursued by these institutions have continuously impoverished poor nations. 
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Many of their programs did not have a clear mandate on poverty, even though 
their role in low-income countries has consequently incorporated poverty re-
duction over time.
There has been considerable debate on the impact of structural adjust-
ment on poverty in Africa. The frequently asked questions have been: Did 
adjustment increased poverty in Africa?, and, Were the poor been adequately 
protected during adjustment? It has been argued that the link between poverty 
and economic reforms is growth, but the distributional impact of reforms still 
remains unclear. Evidence indicates that the poor were not protected from the 
adverse effects of adjustment given that poverty reduction was not considered 
as a goal. The bank attributed this to the failure of both markets and the state 
(World Bank, 2001). From a political economy perspective, several factors 
have undermined poverty reduction efforts in Africa: the absence of a stable 
framework for growth; poor and skewed service delivery and distribution; the 
absence of a poverty reduction strategy; and the inability to target. Lack of 
implementation both from the institutions’ and governments’ perspective has 
also been a major weakness.
A lot has been said about the distributional consequences of economic 
reforms which have been spear-headed by the Bretton Woods Institutions. 
The major critique has been that the economic reforms have imposed excess 
burdens on vulnerable groups, mainly the poor. Looking at country-specific 
case studies, evidence indicates that the economic reforms failed to abate in-
creasing inequality in Kenya, Tanzania, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria, even 
though rural-urban inequalities narrowed for the case of Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana 
and Tanzania (World Bank, 2001).
As indicated above, the introduction of the PRGF facility was seen as a 
significant step towards poverty reduction in low-income countries and also to 
some extent showed the commitment of the Bretton Woods Institutions in meet-
ing the poverty reduction goals. There is considerable evidence that indicates 
that low-income countries, which needed financial assistance from the donors, 
took up the PRSP process seriously. For instance, by March 2004, 37 countries 
(out of a total of 77 eligible countries) had completed a full PRSP. But statis-
tics on growth and development in the continent are disappointing, especially 
considering the number of people who have fallen below the poverty line over 
time. Poverty incidence has continued to increase despite the implementation 
of the Bretton Woods Institutions’ programs.
4. The African Agenda for Poverty Reduction
4.1 The NEPAD Framework
Since the advent of the African crisis and the deteriorating growth and develop-
ment in the late seventies, African leaders have, over time, come up with several 
attempts to spur economic growth and development in the continent. Among 
early initiatives was the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of 
Africa, 1980–2000 (LPA) that was a blueprint for the socioeconomic transforma-
tion of the continent. The objective of the plan was the establishment of a practi-
cal framework for building self-reliance through continental cooperation, which 
was to give way to the establishment of an African Economic Community by the 
year 2000. The long-run development objectives were articulated as follows: 
the alleviation of mass poverty and improvement in the standard of living of the 
people; self-sustained development and national and regional self-reliance. Other 
initiatives were: Africa’s Priority Program for Economic Recovery, 1986–1990 
(APPER), the 1987 Abuja International Conference on the Challenge of Economic 
Recovery and Accelerated Development in Africa; the 1987 Africa’s Common 
Position on External Debt; the 1988 Khartoum International Conference on the 
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Human Dimensions of Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development; and the 
1989 African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) 
for Socioeconomic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP). All these efforts did 
not yield much success as evidenced by the continued economic crisis of the 
continent and the increasing number of people living below the poverty line.
The current developed agenda being pursued by the African states is the 
NEPAD framework, which was officially launched on 23 October 2001 at the 
meeting of the Heads of State implementation committee in Abuja, Nigeria. 
It has its origins in the African Renaissance discourse, which was in fashion 
between 1944 and 1999, but gained momentum with the drafting of the Mil-
lennium Partnership for the African Recovery Program and the Omega Plan for 
Africa. The goals of NEPAD are stated as follows: the promotion of accelerated 
growth and sustainable development; poverty eradication; and ending Africa’s 
marginalization with regard to globalization. Three prerequisites were identified 
for the achievement of social and economic regeneration, poverty alleviation 
and empowerment, which included: peace and security; democracy and politi-
cal governance, and economic and corporate governance. The responsibilities 
of African states as highlighted under NEPAD are: poverty eradication and 
development; entrenching democracy, human rights and respect for the rule 
of law; creation of a conducive environment for private sector mobilization; 
and responding appropriately to the process of globalization. The framework 
rightly concedes that development in Africa is impossible in the absence of true 
democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance. NEPAD 
has been seen as a holistic and comprehensive integrated strategic framework 
for the socioeconomic development of Africa, as Africa’s brainchild, wholly 
perceived and owned by African leaders, and also as a platform for engaging 
with the rest of the world (Adesina, 2002). It is a comprehensive plan to foster 
genuine partnership between Africa and the industrialized powers based on 
mutual interest and benefit, shared commitment and binding agreement under 
African leadership. 
The NEPAD initiative was appreciated as a noble idea, which was meant 
to provide a solution to Africa’s problems of underdevelopment and poverty. 
However, it can be acknowledged that it has some shortcomings that can un-
dermine its capacity and effectiveness of meeting the set objectives. Most of the 
critique of the NEPAD framework revolves around the ownership of the program 
and also the ideologies behind the framework. It has been acknowledged that 
NEPAD fits with the Northern-dominated hegemonic order (Taylor, 2002). It’s 
argued that NEPAD’s mainstream approach to development easily fits into the 
hegemonic norms that stake out the global political economy, as well as pro-
moting a greater role for the international financial institutions in Africa. Adesina 
(2002) also argues that the NEPAD framework has its roots in the neoliberal 
side of the global consensus on development as advocated for by the Bretton 
Woods Institutions, but has no clear and close similarities with the Millennium 
Development Goals. Adesina further argues that NEPAD fundamentally differs 
from MDGs not only in the targets, but also in the mechanisms through which 
the goals are to be achieved. 
The NEPAD framework presents poverty reduction as the major policy 
concern. But this is treated as secondary to the achievement of sustainable 
growth and development. Looking at the four years since the inception of the 
NEPAD, there is barely any evidence on focus on poverty, except that the 
framework proposes better implementation of the PRSP as articulated by the 
Bretton Woods Institutions.
On the general principles behind the NEPAD initiatives, the emphasis on 
neo-liberal policies does not provide any new policy agenda for the continent, 
but rather pushes the agenda of the Western Powers from within the continent. 
13OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
The adoption of NEPAD continues to promote the hegemonic structure of the 
world, given that the ‘ownership’ of the program is quite debatable. Looking 
at the progress made so far in the implementation of the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM), it can be noted that a lot of emphasis has been placed on 
economic, corporate and political governance. Previous experiences of the Bret-
ton Woods Institutions’ support in Africa reveal that poor governance has been 
one of the major reasons why donor support was at certain points withdrawn 
from several countries in the South (Kenya being no exception). Poor perform-
ance of donor programs in the South has also been attributed to poor govern-
ance in these economies. Consider that implementation of NEPAD is based on 
a trade-off; for African leaders to develop a culture of democracy, accountability 
and good governance, while the industrialized North to recommit themselves 
to Africa’s development through debt relief, increases in the level of the Official 
Development Assistance, infrastructural development and foreign direct invest-
ment. NEPAD is more like a fulfillment of previous donor conditionalities, with 
the argument that donor aid will be effective with good governance. What is 
new on this agenda? It is still a win-lose situation, whereby it is strictly ‘link and 
developed’ or ‘delink and underdeveloped’. For instance, is it coincidence that 
the main countries pushing the NEPAD agenda are the largest recipients of FDI in 
Africa? By agreeing to the trade-off, Africa has clearly failed to decide its destiny 
given that the continent has to wait for the industrialized countries of the North 
to eradicate poverty and ensure sustainable development. From the center-
periphery development paradigm, the development agenda will continue to be 
in favor of the Western Powers given that it is always a win- lose situation.
4.2 Poverty Reduction Initiatives in Kenya (NEPAD framework, MDGs and  
PRSPs/ERSWEC)
Poverty is a major concern of governments all over the world, and countless 
poverty-alleviation programs and campaigns have been developed across re-
gions and over time. Since independence, one of the principal goals of Kenya’s 
development effort has been to reduce poverty (Manda et al, 2001). The gov-
ernment has pursued this through various development strategies emphasizing 
economic growth, employment creation and provision of basic social services. 
Yet poverty continues to be a major impediment to human development and 
economic progress. Approximately 56% of Kenya’s population lives below the 
poverty line (which is projected to increase to 60% by the end of 2005). The 
implementation of the poverty reduction strategy paper seemed promising, but 
its success in poverty reduction is yet to be realized. 
The drafting of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper was completed in 
Kenya in 2001. This drafting documented priorities and measures which were 
considered necessary for poverty reduction and economic growth. The main 
focus was on: facilitating sustained and rapid economic growth; improving 
governance and security; increasing the ability of the poor to raise their income 
levels; improving the quality of life of the poor and improving equity and par-
ticipation. It was in light of the above that the National Poverty Eradication Plan 
(NPEP) was initiated, which was in line with the MDGs.
With a new government taking office in January 2003, a new strategy 
for economic recovery was adopted. The ‘Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) 
for Wealth and Employment Creation’ (ERSWEC) which is a medium-term 
framework (1993-1997) was formulated to replace the PRSP and had the main 
objectives of restoring economic growth, generating employment and reduc-
ing high levels of poverty. Major emphasis of the framework is on the role of 
macroeconomic stability in achieving the set objectives. Decentralization and 
devolution of power are some of the modalities for ensuring that services are 
delivered effectively and efficiently to communities. 
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The ERSWEC is the operating policy framework within which Kenya has 
been tackling the MDGs challenges, identified pro-poor policies as those that 
entail improvement in the status of education, health and nutrition, HIV/AIDS, 
employment, social security, food security and security concerns amongst 
others. To maximize the impact of these policies on the poor, the government 
designed a number of core poverty programs (CPPs) that are ring fenced in the 
budget. CPPs are ring fenced in the sense that budgetary allocations to them 
is mandatory and their receipt should be totally in order to impact positively 
on chronic poverty. Their implementation was expected to impact directly and 
positively on the standards of living of the Kenyan society by increasing incomes 
for the poor and the value of their assets significantly. The programs were pri-
oritized by the government to cushion the poor from unanticipated budget cuts 
and also ensure that they targeted goals. The program follows a sector-specific 
approach. Consider the case of pro-poor government expenditure on education, 
health and other special programmes:
Educationa. 
The key goals in the education sector include attainment of Universal 
Primary Education (UPE) by 2005, and Education for All (EFA) by 
2015, goals which are in tandem with MDGs. In pursuit of these, the 
ERSWEC identified education as a major determinant of earnings 
and, therefore, providing an important exit route from poverty. Educa-
tion improves people’s ability to take advantage of the opportunities 
that can improve their livelihoods and enhance their participation in 
community ventures and markets. The broad objectives identified 
include 100% net primary school enrollment through compulsory 
free primary education and the reduction in the disparity in access 
to quality education. The Ministry has seven recurrent and four-
development expenditure CPPs aimed at directing resources towards 
attaining UPE for all. Between 2003/04 and 2004/05, total recurrent 
expenditure allocations increased by about 9%, whereas develop-
ment expenditure allocations dropped markedly by 50%. The budget, 
however, fails to allocate resources to some key pro-poor expenditure 
(mainly development) areas in the education sector, while reducing 
allocations to some, undermining their significant role of being pro-
poor even though they are supposed to be ring fenced.
Healthb. 
One of objectives of the government has been the creation of an 
environment that enables the provision of a sustainable quality health 
care that is acceptable, affordable and accessible to all Kenyans. 
In conformity, the ERSWEC strategizes to ensure that these fun-
damental goals are met, but the outstanding challenge facing the 
poor, however, is affordability. The reform initiatives that have been 
undertaken, especially targeting the poor, include: initiating a National 
Social Health Insurance Scheme (NSHIS), converting National Hos-
pital Insurance Fund (NHIF) into National Social Hospital Insurance 
Fund (NSHIF), covering both inpatient and outpatient treatments 
and sharing costs amongst the Exchequer, employers and employ-
ees; setting up of a special Health Care Endowment Fund to target 
vulnerable groups; rehabilitating existing health facilities; overhaul-
ing the system of procurement and distribution of drugs for public 
health facilities; and fresh recruitment for essential health services. 
The ministry has twelve CPPs falling under both recurrent and de-
velopment expenditure allocations. In the last budgetary allocations 
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total recurrent expenditures fell by about 7%, whereas development 
expenditure allocations increased significantly by nearly 91%.
 Other special programsc. 
The Office of the President has a docket that handles special programs, 
which include: the management of HIV/AIDS pandemic, disaster and 
emergency response coordination, relief and rehabilitation, food se-
curity, security operations amongst others. HIV/AIDS is the single 
most serious health and development challenge facing the country. It 
exerts tremendous pressure on the health care delivery system, yet the 
prospects of finding a cure remain elusive. Total allocations to develop-
ment expenditures increased by 46.1% in 2004/05, but allocations to 
recurrent expenditures fell by 3.5%. Development expenditure alloca-
tions to National Aids Control Council increased significantly by 65.3% 
from Kshs.2,250.5 billion to Kshs.3,686.2 billion between 2003/04 
and 2004/05, with all the increment coming from the government, 
which increased its allocations from approximately Kshs.2.21 billion to 
Kshs.3.69 billion, whereas appropriations in aid fell from Kshs.20 million 
to Kshs.17.5 million. Its recurrent expenditure allocations remained fairly 
constant at about Kshs. 150 million over the same period.
Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs)d.  Program
ASAL areas have relatively high levels of poverty incidence and have 
traditionally been a low priority in public resource allocation, which 
implies that development of the area is key in addressing poverty 
reduction. Over 80% of all livestock in Kenya is found in ASAL areas. 
The priority development areas were identified as: roads rehabilita-
tion; implementation of a broad-based livestock development policy; 
facilitation of private sector development of fishing infrastructure; 
strengthening of community-based ecotourism; development of 
special school programs; strengthening of community based health 
care systems and preventive medicine and improvement of food se-
curity. During 2003/04, the Arid Land Resource Management Project 
(ALRMP) expanded to 22 ASAL districts, the Natural Resource and 
Drought Management program was introduced to address the prob-
lem of vulnerability and sustainable development and, in an effort 
to address the water problem in the areas, 150 dams and water 
bans were rehabilitated and 39 boreholes drilled and equipped. To 
enhance communication, the Ministry of Information and Communi-
cation initiated a program to provide wireless network systems. 
Slum upgrading and low-cost housinge. 
The Investment Program for the Economic Recovery Strategy (IP-
ERS) objective of slum upgrading is to improve the living conditions 
of millions of poor people who live in urban slums, mainly in Nairobi 
and Mombasa. This is done through the development of slum up-
grading and relocation plans and the enactment of housing legislation 
to facilitate the private expansion of low cost housing and housing 
financing. There is no considerable progress in this area since the 
project is yet to be implemented.
4.3 What is the Progress so far?
Since the initiation of the poverty reduction initiatives in 2001, there has been 
considerable increase in expenditures geared towards education and health. The 
target for the incidence of primary repetition was met, but the performance for 
transition to secondary education was significantly below target. Performance in 
terms of health outcome indicators has been poor. For instance, the percentage 
SOUTH-SOUTH COLLABORATIVE PROGRAMME
of children less than one year fully immunized remained constant at 10% below 
the target. Likewise, the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel 
was also well below target (42% was achieved against a target of 70.8%). The 
malaria target was not met (incidence was 10% higher than the target). The 
country is not on track regarding health MDGs, and more needs to be done if 
the MDGs are to be met. In terms of the implementation of the ASAL project, 
implementation was done in 22 districts through mainly supporting agriculture 
and livestock keeping. School feeding programs were also implemented in the 
ASALs, but these did not have the anticipated impact on the enrollment rates 
in these areas. In general, under-financing remains one of the big challenges in 
meeting the MDGs. Despite these efforts, poverty incidence has worsened over 
time, and it is expected to increase to about 60% up from 56%. Two major policy 
questions arise from this scenario. Do the poverty alleviation programs being 
implemented have any impact on poverty? If they do, then, what is the major 
reason for the negative outcome? If the programs are right, then implementa-
tion or financing constraints could be the problems. These questions need to 
be addressed on a country-by-country case.
5. Conclusion
Can the current development agenda enhance poverty reduction in Africa? As 
evidenced by respective country experiences, poverty incidence is still on the rise 
despite the various poverty reduction programs being implemented. Concerns 
have been raised about whether the current policy agenda can lead to poverty 
reduction. As Taylor (2002) posits, if NEPAD is the best hope for Africa, then the 
future indeed looks bleak for the continent and its peoples. 
There is no blueprint on policies for poverty reduction, but there are several 
principles that can be established to guide formulation of policies for poverty 
reduction. Firstly, the policies should be homegrown or locally owned, with 
broad based consensus. Country ownership is not only important for success, 
but also to ensure that the measures or policies are country-specific. This was 
one of the weaknesses of the previous Fund/Bank programs. Governments 
also need to be accountable. Corruption is rampant in most African economies. 
Secondly, there is a need for a clear understanding of the causes of poverty, 
and also the appropriate measures that can alleviate the poverty. For instance, 
for the Kenyan case, there has been no clear understanding of the link between 
micro and macro aspects of the economy, and limited efforts have been made 
to provide such an understanding, which is relevant for evaluating the effective-
ness of using fiscal policies for poverty reduction. Thirdly, strategies aimed at 
alleviating poverty must be directly targeted at the poor. Indirect approaches 
which rely on trickle down effects of the macro- and micro-economy may not 
benefit the poor. Fourthly, many countries have considered decentralization of the 
central government, which has been seen as a means of reaching the local poor 
people, but fiscal decentralization may not necessarily be pro-poor. Evidence 
from African case studies indicates a poor record, both in terms of participation 
and socio-economic impact (Crook and Sverrisson, 1999, as quoted by World 
Bank, 2001). Fifthly, emphasis on poverty reduction has also been on promoting 
pro-poor growth, but the recent growth experience in most African countries 
reveals that poverty incidence has been increasing as these economies have 
been growing. This calls for a look into the sources of growth in these economies 
and their likely link with the local poor people. Lastly, poverty should be dealt 
with in tandem with other socio-economic problems facing most of the African 
nations, for instance, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and also conflict. Thus, African 
governments need to rethink their poverty reduction agenda if the continent is 
to make progress in reducing poverty. 
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